Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)


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Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 : Evaluation of the World Bank Group Program

Second, most of the Phase 2 evaluations — the central source of evidence — did not consistently use any standard set of data sources or always apply the comparable rating scales suggested in the Evaluation Matrix. Instead, they selected from and supplemented the range of sources and ratings proposed to capture the particularities of each country situation. The Synthesis takes as a given the diversity of these approaches and does not attempt to re-impose standard sources at this stage.

For this reason, the analysis here presents an aggregate picture, drawing out the common findings and highlighting variations, quantifying them as far as possible and illustrating key points with informative examples. Other streams of work. They were identified and agreed in the Evaluation Framework in December It will remain accessible and serve as the most important record of sources for the entire Evaluation.

As noted in the Technical Annex, the process has already yielded some valuable insights into the complexities of conducting multi-country and multi-agency studies, balancing the need for autonomy at the local level with the consistency of findings required for synthesis work, and the difficulties of tracing causality and attribution. Looking elsewhere, the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey results applied to donors are generally not reported or cited as a set. When the Core Team tested a compilation of the raw results from the and Surveys, the results emerging raised a number of questions over and above the country results that are usually reported.

These concerns may or may not be answered with the Survey. The fact that other recent attempts admittedly experimental to construct comparative assessments of donor quality performance rely so heavily in turn on some of the Survey results compounds the risks. More specialised assessments on themes such as donor decentralisation and transparency have however been helpful.

It highlights the common elements and trends, as well as revealing significant differences. The com mon thread is that these distinctions have been shaped mainly by the bureaucratic, political and economic conditions in different partner and donor countries, as well as by the ways in which they interact. As recent global events have highlighted, recession, financial, food, fuel or other crises and major disasters can also have dramatic effects on international cooperation and reform processes. The following sections consider the main issues which have emerged.

The Declaration responds to a set of recognised problems. It proposes solutions drawn from the experience of partner countries and donors. Even sceptical observers have acknowledged that the Declaration is a major initiative to bring about change in the field of international development cooperation and perhaps in international relations more generally. Several differences from previous initiatives offer grounds for confidence that it would move beyond good intentions to tangible results:.

Once endorsed and launched, this unique strategic initiative for change had to be understood and acted on — individually and collectively — by many actors in both partner and donor countries. By the time of the mid-term High Level Forum in Accra a number of challenges had come to light.

These issues were reflected in the results of the Accra Forum. The need to engage actors outside the executive branches of central governments — legislators, other levels of government, civil society and the private sector — came to the fore. A final message from Accra, supported by a number of findings in the Evaluation, is that when knowledge of and engagement in aid reform extends to the full range of actors including the legislature, sub-national governments civil society and the private sector — rather than to only a few ministers and agencies of the central government — it is likely to provide a stronger base for implementing the aid effectiveness agenda.

The Accra Agenda encouraged all development actors, including those engaged in South-South cooperation and global funds and programmes, to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference in providing development cooperation. It drew attention to the role of middle-income countries as both providers and receivers of aid, the importance and particularities of South-South cooperation, encouraged the further development of triangular cooperation, and looked to deeper engagement with civil society organisations in improving aid effectiveness.

The Declaration responded directly to a broad set of recognised problems and put forward potential solutions drawn from the experience of participating partner countries and donors. Each of the respective reports highlights the particular dynamics shaping the responses and performance of individual partner countries and donors. It is highly signifi-cant that their starting points were quite different, with some countries and donor agencies heavily engaged and advanced in the aid effectiveness agenda well before , and others much less so.

The effects of these differences emerge repeatedly in the individual reports within the Evaluation — some partners appear now almost to have completed the work of reform, others to have barely begun. By stressing the need to put aid in its broader context, the Evaluation has helped to highlight larger questions about the changing understandings of the nature and relative importance of aid itself. These questions are key to understanding the potential influence and limits of the aid reform campaign. It is clear from evaluation reports and studies that in every aid-receiving and aid-providing country, aid programmes are subject to influences, actors, forces and events that are more powerful than the direct objectives, interests and resources of aid programmes themselves.

In partner countries, aid is rarely more than a small share of the economic resources available for development, although it may in some cases represent a substantial share of development investments or government budgets. At the same time, the different ways in which these questions were approached within the component evaluations for this Report reveal how this aid is actually very differently seen and handled.

Some of the evaluations focus on the share of resources aid represents in relation to Gross Domestic Income or other measures of the total economy. Others cite aid as a share of investment or public investment, and yet others refer to it as a share of central government expenditure or government expenditure more generally. Consequently, it has been challenging to extract comprehensive and comparable answers from the different evaluations about the total resources — internal and external — mobilised for development.

The main findings and conclusions are summarised in Box 1 below. It is important to stress that this study was focused on the financial flows involved in different forms of development cooperation. Thus it does not capture or reflect some important dimensions of South-South cooperation, which are understood to be strongly based on knowledge exchange between partner countries, sometimes also bringing in multilateral organisations and traditional donors in particular roles.

Box 1.

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Exceptional caution is required about claims on the magnitude, scope and character of financial flows to developing countries from non-Declaration sources. Available data on these flows are weak, non-transparent and generally unreliable, or in many cases simply unavailable. Many of the claims pointing to a new age of private international philanthropy aimed at the poorest countries would seem to be highly inflated.

For bilateral South-South Cooperation SSC a general lack of integrated information about projects, conditions, co-financing and financial support makes it impossible to determine the extent to which SSC funding is ODA-like. While financial flows on a bilateral or South-South basis from non-Declaration countries are substantial, it is clear that a significant percentage of these do not meet Declaration criteria. Although an accurate determination of non-Declaration resources that are ODA-like is not possible, it is clear from this study that non-Declaration providers add to a growing diversity of channels and financial instruments to deliver development resources.

The emergence of new donors and the pattern of their development financing point to an even greater need than before for transparent information, coordination, harmonisation and governance leadership. Evidence exists of a growing network of interactions between donors and this suggests that there is an indirect effect of the Declaration on the activities of non-Declaration donors.

The increasing importance of non-DAC donors has created pressure for modifications to the rules that define ODA so that different forms of South-South Cooperation can be included. This raises fundamental questions and a serious risk that change will be driven more by political correctness than by concern for development effectiveness.

It would, be unfortunate if this were to result in two sets of rules, a first for traditional donors and a second for new and emerging donors. The Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action represent major advances in donor transparency, in the criteria for aid effectiveness and in mutual accountability. These should be preserved and advanced further in order to include new and emerging donors. The study also includes an analysis of trends in total external financing flows to developing countries, showing the relative place of aid over time and in different groups of countries.

UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS)

The study findings suggest that the Declaration is directly relevant to only a small percentage of total net capital flows to developing countries as a bloc, but considerably more to the majority of developing countries beyond a small group of middle income and emerging economies. At the aggregate level, three main trends emerge when comparing the broad categories of official and private [37] financial flows from the s to the present:.

In further trends, the strengthening of international and domestic capital markets has contributed to leveraging additional resources from external and domestic savings to development financing, at least in emerging economies. The changing overall profile of total resource flows signals important changes that have taken place in the financing alternatives to aid that have opened up to middle-income countries. A range of these effects — some of which also apply to other countries — can be found in the relevant country evaluations.

While some of these changing conditions might be taken to imply a diminishing interest in aid or aid reforms in middle income countries, the evaluations examined here report a different finding. These countries are aware that they still face persistent development challenges — particularly around stubborn inequalities — as well as new ones, and are keen to use the particular tools and limited amounts of aid to maximum effect. They also have capacity to take leading roles and responsibilities in applying lessons to improve international aid reform efforts and in designing and contributing to the future architecture for international development cooperation.

A number of the implications of the lessons and trends of aid effectiveness identified in middle income countries will be apparent in the conclusions and recommendations of this Report. In the majority of countries where aid remains quantitatively important, the Evaluation has found that even over the past years, the importance and roles of aid can shift with many types of changes — international economic, energy or food crises; natural disasters; ongoing conflicts or their aftermath; political changes; new resource discoveries; new private sector developments or the growth of other international partnerships beyond the reach of the aid reform agenda.

Any of these changes can also affect the political attention and capital that will be invested in long-term aid reforms. Less obvious, but still powerful influences on the role of aid and the potential for reform have included: the stability of governance and trends toward decentralisation; basic public sector capacities; demographic, health and social trends including inequality; and environmental vulnerability. The evaluation reports generally reflect the main areas of coverage requested by the Operational Matrix, in most cases covering factual and formal organisational aspects more fully than those questions calling for more qualitative analyses and judgements.

Thus, most reports provided full responses to questions about key economic features, issues and trends; the organisation of government and aid management; national development strategies; and the basic information on aid flows, collectively and from different donors. It was therefore important to the US evaluation to clarify that the focus for purposes of the Paris disciplines [42] was mainly on ODA. Rather than attempting to apply retroactively any standard measure in order to simplify its comparisons, the Evaluation has seen these differences of practice in different countries as significant findings in themselves, and integrated them into the analysis.

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Individual country evaluations also raise statistical obstacles to any standard view. The need was recognised in the Declaration itself, and support to statistical capacity building was the subject of a thematic study for the Evaluation in However, one much-needed clarification on aid to individual countries is now being increasingly tested and refined. The concept of Country Programmable Aid has the potential to concentrate attention in aid relationships on the real stakes, moving away from misleading gross numbers on aid spending.

It refers to the portion of total aid that each donor can actually programme for each receiving country. Focusing on Country Programmable Aid as the basis for work between partner countries and donors to improve aid effectiveness will rapidly improve the quality of information and dialogue, as well as public understanding in both partner and donor countries. Distinctive features of aid in fragile situations and humanitarian relief.

The Evaluation made use of the evidence from the country evaluation in prominent case — Afghanistan — together with several other sources reflecting the growing experience and thinking about these issues in a wide range of countries. On the other hand, it is clear that in fragile situations, internal and external contextual factors are usually even more critical than elsewhere in shaping the potential and limits of aid, and a number of factors are distinctive.

These may include multiple internal contexts for example where different parties have de facto control of different parts of the country , less organised capacity, legitimacy or will in the partner country. But another key distinctive feature of many such situations is the strong involvement of a wider range of powerful international actors, such as foreign ministries, military forces and international political and relief agencies, together with multiple humanitarian and relief agencies.

It is clear that the additional difficulties in coordinating these many powerful actors and their different interests, priorities and timeframes is sometimes used as a rationalisation for failures to apply those good practices that are relevant. The Afghanistan report provides evidence of several major aspects of aid performance where the Declaration principles could and should be applied to a greater degree than they have been in this highly volatile and risky situation.

Afghanistan has been recognised as an especially challenging case in the monitoring of the implementation of the Fragile States Principles since in six very different situations around the world. But the general findings are consistent and highlight the shift of greater influence and thus responsibility for good practice in fragile states and situations onto the outside actors, given the reduced capabilities of domestic actors.

Both the Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action suggest that, with some adaptation, they should apply. The Evaluation has rapidly surveyed the experience with applying the agreed Principles and good practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship as well as major evaluation results such those dealing with as the work of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Evaluation Coalition in recent years.

Mustering political, bureaucratic and public support for aid reforms has depended on key interests and actors believing that the changes will be worthwhile and feasible. Neither conclusion could be taken for granted. There is familiarity, and often strong vested interests, in existing ways of operating and these are not necessarily outweighed by the concern to resolve evident problems. In many partner countries, key capacities for aid management were stretched to the limits in order simply to keep existing systems running in a period of increasing aid volumes for most countries, and undertaking major reforms was an additional challenge.

The country evaluations provide two major explanations for why and how the necessary changes have taken hold, if gradually and unevenly in many cases:.

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For donors: In donor countries — the main supporters of both their own bilateral aid programmes and the multilateral aid agencies — international development aid has to compete for political and public attention with a wider range of domestic and international issues than in most partner countries. Thus in most donor countries, these programmes not only are vastly overshadowed by domestic concerns and government activities but also by other international programmes in defence and security, trade, diplomacy, migration and other spheres.

As elaborated in the next chapter, in comparison with partner countries, the aid reform changes asked of donors under the Declaration agenda are generally less demanding and their capacities for implementing change are greater. But here too the necessary political, bureaucratic and public understanding and support for aid reforms has depended on key interests and actors first being well-informed of the agenda and then convinced that making the changes will be beneficial and feasible.

There may be resistance, for example, from established institutional interests. Another key condition is how much, if at all, the Declaration approach — working to improve aid in a cooperative international process with partner countries and other donors — is viewed as valuable and useful. It is worth listing them here. Among constraints were cited:. In other cases, this international part of engagement is found to be more nominal, irrelevant or even negative when confronted with obstacles to changing existing practices, or with new ministers or governments who were not party to the original agreements.

In the largest donor country, the United States, however, the change of administration is credited with having raised government interest in joining forces in the international effort. Previously, it was common to refer to aid effectiveness efforts without referring to the Declaration. By contrast, the study in Sweden found that critical international findings on Swedish performance in aid effectiveness from the Declaration Monitoring Survey attracted attention as a reality check on a more favourable impression at home.

Declaration implementation is reported as important for influencing priority setting and associated organisational adaptation. There have been substantial variations over time because the commitments, capacities and incentives for change have also varied widely. Different approaches to this type of analysis can result in significant variations on numbers and breakdowns, e.

The Colombian and South African teams in particular collaborated in promoting consultations among this group during the Evaluation process and in assembling thoughts on common issues for consideration in the Synthesis. In any case they perpetuate uncertainty and do not encourage trust. These include costs for overseas students and refugee settlement in donor countries.

Development Brief Consultation Draft, Issue 1. Finally, the Core Team drew on selected sources see Bibliography to cross check the relevance of the emerging findings and conclusions in this area to humanitarian assistance activities. The ground-breaking evaluation in this area was the major humanitarian assistance component of the Rwanda evaluation in the s. This chapter of the Report analyses the evidence on the central question of whether the Declaration campaign has had the intended effects of improving both the effectiveness of aid as defined in the question and the quality of partnerships between countries and aid providers.

At the risk of oversimplifying complex questions and answers, the Synthesis Report presents an overall appraisal of the effects of the Declaration on aid effectiveness distilled in Table 2 below. It comes with the cautions that this can be only a very broad analysis since on most of the intended outcomes there are such major differences in the performance of individual partner countries and donors.

For this reason, aggregate or average ratings across the whole group would be meaningless or misleading. Thus the multiple ratings given list the largest category first, followed by any smaller one s. For example, on intended Outcome V. The accompanying diagram Figure 5 on page shows graphically the range of performance against each intended outcome. The detailed assessments in the rest of this chapter are integral to a full understanding of the findings. The standards for defining the pace of progress and distance remaining are elaborated in the Technical Annex.

In summary, however, the relative and absolute are blended. If a number of countries or donors have been able to substantially achieve the end condition in the intended outcome, then this is taken as a measure of the possible, and the pace and distance remaining for others is assessed accordingly. Overall findings: Since the problems which the Declaration campaign is intended to resolve were 50 years in the making, with so many actors and interests involved, it is not surprising that the pace in changing them over the past 5 to 10 years has been mostly slow to moderate , and that a substantial distance remains to the satisfactory resolution of many.

At the same time, a number of partner countries and donors have been able to achieve a faster pace of change, and have little further distance to go on some changes. There is now significant internal commitment and momentum embedded in most partner countries and it has withstood changing circumstances. Among donors, the most striking feature is the highly uneven pace of change — with a handful of exemplars of good practice, a good number of gradual and partial subscribers and some potential backsliders.

Overall both leading and lagging records among partner countries and aid providers underline the need and the potential to apply lessons and accelerate further improvements. A serious limitation is that there is no authoritative source of evidence for breaking down the performance of individual donors systematically on most of these expected outcomes, but credible examples are cited where available.

This Synthesis assessment also takes into account factors that have often been overlooked or blurred in assessments of performance, but have been integrated in Table 2 and in the assessments throughout this chapter:. To answer this central question, the evaluations were asked to assess and explain the progress achieved, or not, in realising each of the 11 intended outcomes specified in the Declaration.

This framework for assessing changes in aid effectiveness was used in the standard Matrix for all country evaluations. Most of the evaluations used comparable rating scales selectively, preferring to capture the particularities of each case. For this reason the analysis here presents an aggregate picture, highlighting the most common findings, themes and main variations, illustrating important points with representative examples and reflecting more particular findings in the detailed analysis.

Differing terms of reference meant that no systematic cross-checking between country evaluations and donor studies was possible, but there are significant points on which the readings from the country level including inputs from field level donor personnel intersect with the findings at donor headquarters levels and in other analyses. As a further way of shedding light on progress in relation to the Accra Agenda for Action, the intended outcomes were clustered under the main action headings of: country ownership of development, building more inclusive and effective partnerships for development and delivering and accounting for development results.

Table 2.

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Click to see the table: Table 2. Figure 5: Aggregated progress — range of performance against each intended outcome. Taking account of their very different conditions, almost all of the 21 country evaluations find that a reasonably robust national development strategy is in place. Some of these are very strong, capturing both medium- to long-term development objectives and political priorities. Most of these countries have evolved different types of strategies over more than a decade, recognising the limits of planning and allowing for necessary flexibility. At least two-thirds credit the Declaration campaign with some influence in strengthening these strategic frameworks since On the other hand, only about a third of the evaluations find a clear strengthening of country-owned sectoral and sub-national strategies and resource allocation linkages that would make the national strategy fully operational and provide the full expected guidance and discipline for donor interventions.

This goal included a commitment to developing and implementing these strategies through consultation. Different groups of stakeholders have different definitions of satisfactory performance under this commitment, and there is no simple yardstick. The picture emerging in the other half of the evaluations is unclear, mixed or static. The Bangladesh report outlines some representative findings, and important sub-themes and complexities.

While an inclusive consultative process for developing national strategies has been well established, there is, however, virtually no consultation with the beneficiaries and other stakeholders in formulating individual development projects. Despite some progress, foreign aided projects continue to remain mostly donor driven and designing and preparation of such projects are often donor led. Particularly, technical assistance projects, many of them aiming to reform the existing country systems are undertaken at the initiatives of the donor without having consultation with the stakeholders.

As a result, such projects suffer from lack of ownership and are often not demand-driven. Where country leadership at the operational level has not been as strong, donors have been left a wide margin to interpret national priorities, although national leadership and donor responsiveness are sometimes found in particular sectors. The evaluations and studies have shown considerable donor engagement on point 2 above, and less on points 1 and 3.

The record on implementing other Declaration commitments point 4 will be further analysed in the following sections. Findings: While there is no evidence of backsliding, the pace has been mostly slow and the distances travelled by donors in aligning their aid vary by donor, by country and by the different aspects of alignment involved.

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The differing time horizons and programming cycles for country and donor strategies is a significant problem for alignment. Nevertheless, off-budget and off-plan activities still remain, indicating lack of alignment with Government of Ghana priorities and systems. Whereas Ministries Departments and Agencies lack capacity to plan, Development Partners are also limited by their own institutional arrangements and procedures. Thus although a new aid landscape is being witnessed, aid effectiveness challenges still remain.

Challenges with country systems and non-use or partial use by donors due to mistrust has undermined country systems. Across evaluations, programme-based approaches, joint assistance frameworks and multi-donor trust funds are identified as helping strengthen alignment. The continuing prevalence of project implementation units is noted in the Senegal and Vietnam evaluations but in neither case is this simply seen as a result of donor non-compliance. More generally, the reliance on these units does not emerge from the Evaluation as either a simple issue or a burning one. As the examples … show, the problem can only to some extent be addressed through capacity building.

On the negative side of the ledger, a large majority of the evaluations find only limited if any overall increase by most donors in the use of country systems and procedures, notably financial and procurement systems. Other examples of donor reluctance or pullback were linked to specific disputes, for instance about a government change in applying procurement requirements.

In terms of help by donors for capacity development to strengthen country systems, half of the evaluations included substantial findings, beyond the specific area of help with public financial management and procurement which is treated in the following section. These evaluations point to significant efforts, but not notably well-coordinated or harmonised ones, and with limited measurable results to date.

The three main explanations provided are:. In a few cases, the evaluations find that strong multi-donor support arrangements have led to more coordinated and apparently effective capacity development support. Findings: At least two thirds of the evaluations reporting on this outcome find that the countries are moving in the right direction, but mostly slowly.

The difficulties in achieving these goals appear greater than presumed and the progress goals set for leave great room for interpretation of how much progress is enough for donors to actually trust and use country systems. Two countries claimed that this work is done. Of the remaining country evaluations, a third find considerable effort and progress, another third find gradual and uneven progress, and a third find little progress. In all these countries, however, there now appears to be significant internal commitment and momentum.

This would appear to suggest digging in for the next stage in a longer journey, learning from success and setbacks and finding the best ways of working towards further step-by-step improvements, with donors using the systems as much as possible to help improve them. Almost all of the evaluations report sustained efforts some longer and harder than others to achieve these outcomes, and different levels of progress achieved.

None of the evaluations finds any major backsliding, but as captured in the quote below, all have found that achieving these goals is complex and difficult, working and building in linked stages. At least as important as the technical and management challenges in improving these systems are other powerful obstacles. Other hurdles identified are limited human and technical capacities, frequent rotation of personnel and the consequences of a range of external crises — food, energy, economic — dominating the attention of key actors.

Few of the evaluations include coverage of the expected standard for environmental assessments. One notable exception is the first and second phase evaluations in Bangladesh, where environmental issues featured in sectoral treatments. Findings: Seen from the country level, while the overall direction is right, the pace and distance covered are far behind the implied expectations for harmonisation by this stage, especially considering that major international commitments on harmonisation go back to the Rome Declaration of Aid fragmentation is still found to be high in at least half of the evaluations.

Many experiments are underway, particularly at sectoral or thematic levels, and joint funding arrangements may create a more conducive environment for reducing duplication, although sometimes at the cost of adding complex new processes. None of the evaluations finds major progress in the achievement of this outcome on harmonisation since at the country level although all countries record changes in coordination structures thematic groups etc.

The quotes below are representative of a wide range of findings:. However, most development partners are caught between working collectively at country level and responding to differing priorities and concerns of their Headquarters. Inevitably, pressure remains on some development partners to retain direct accountability of their aid. The situation with reducing duplication and rationalising donor activities is still not simple and neither is it entirely bleak. The Uganda evaluation [83] finds that the process of rationalisation of donor efforts was already strongly in place before under government leadership, and five other reports [84] also find government leading in these efforts, while the Colombia and Vietnam reports do not find significant progress.

However, the EU monitoring reports suggest that division of labour efforts are still mainly promoted by donors, which may help explain why they appear to be more effective in sectoral areas than at the broad strategic level. In two other cases the UK and the Netherlands the increased use of programme modalities is credited with improvements, and the Australian update indicates that the use of delegated cooperation among donors is growing in its programme as a tool for scaling up its funding. There are few other references to this in the evaluations or studies.

The Vietnam evaluation specifically finds that the government is ready to accept the costs of donor duplication as part of the price for valued political relationships. Untying: Half of the country evaluations report findings on the untying of aid. The Benin evaluation reports that basically all aid is untied, and the Mali and Bolivia studies find that further progress is being made. The Bolivia report reflects the high variability that remains among donors. A quarter of the evaluations raise questions around the statistics showing that tied aid is either eliminated or further reduced, citing the following findings:.

The box below provides the gist of the findings of a thematic study completed in The results, supported by a set of country and donor cases, are consistent with the findings from the evaluations. The changes over the past 10 years indicate that the Recommendation on untying of aid, together with other international agreements such as the Paris Declaration, have had an overall positive impact on further untying aid.


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But there are important qualifications. Also outside the Recommendation were: emergency and humanitarian aid both in-kind and through personnel, channelling of aid through NGOs, support to governance, post-secondary education, research and Business to Business assistance. De facto practice: Many informants raise questions about the genuineness of the declared formal untying of aid.

Advanced search Help. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Public Health Health Policy. Nordic Council of Ministers. Back to Results. Print Cite Citation Alert off. Get Code Buy. These studies cover issues related to monetary policy and operations, financial markets, payment systems, and financial regulation and supervision, with an emphasis on both the substance of the issues and the modalities of technical support.

The book illustrates that the formulation of sound monetary and financial policies needs to be complemented by proper and efficient implementation. Although the government deserves most of the credit, this success would not have been possible without external development and security partners, including the World Bank Group. Regarding outcomes, the rebuilding of public institutions has seen substantial progress, with important achievements in restoring public finances and reforming the civil service. Regarding the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the World Bank Group has helped improve the conditions of roads, ports, power supply, and water and sanitation.

However, World Bank Group financial support has been relatively modest with regard to facilitating growth, but it has helped with policy advice and in filling gaps left by other partners. With regard to the three cross-cutting themes of Bank Group strategy, some effective programs were carried out, including capacity development at several core public finance-related agencies. However, the integration of these themes across World Bank Group interventions, which was the underlying intent, still needs a vision and better articulated strategy. See Less -. All language versions and volumes across World Bank Repositories.

Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies) Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)
Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies) Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)
Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies) Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)
Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies) Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)
Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies) Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)
Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies) Liberia Country Program Evaluation 2004-2011 (Independent Evaluation Group Studies)

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